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海外之声 | 全球银行业“大而不倒”改革的启示

在2008年世界金融危机发生之后 ， G20国家采取了一系列改革以增强金融系统的安全性 。 以减少道德风险和系统性风险为目的 ， 此类改革的核心元素之一便是“大而不倒改革（too-big-to-failreforms）” 。 这些改革包含了通过资本附加费吸收额外损失的标准以及对总损失吸收能力的要求 ， 加强监管和提高监管期望的建议 ， 和建立有效的解决方案制度和解决方案计划从而改善银行的可解决性的政策 。
受这些改革影响的许多具有系统重要性的银行都是跨国经营的 。 因此 ， 解决“大而不倒”问题的有效政策需要国际政策的协调 ， 而金融稳定委员会（FinancialStabilityBoard）在这方面起着重要作用 。
金融稳定委员会正在评估针对这些系统性重要银行的“大而不倒”改革 。 6月28日 ， FSB发布了一份参考报告 。 其主要评估结论可大致归纳如下：
系统性风险和道德风险指标有所下降 。 具有系统重要性的银行已更好地进行资本组织 ， 并且已经积累了显著的亏损吸收能力 。 如今其资金成本似乎可以反映在崩溃情况发生时自救的可能性 。
有效的“大而不倒”改革为社会带来了净收益 。 银行不仅具有了更大的韧性 ， 也没有任何迹象表明存在重大的负面影响 。 尤其是实体经济的信贷总供给并未减少 。
仍有缺漏需要填补 。 一些解决性的障碍依旧存在 ， 可供市场参与者和公共当局使用的信息也存在差距 。
作者|克劳迪娅·布赫（ClaudiaM.Buch） ， 德意志联邦银行（DeutscheBundesbank）副行长
英文原文如下：
Implicationsofthetoo-big-to-failreformsforglobalbanking
RemarksbyClaudiaM.Buch,Vice-President,DeutscheBundesbank,preparedfortheIIF-BPIColloquiumonCross-BorderResolution&Regulation
09.07.2020|Virtuell
Motivation
Intheaftermathofthe2008globalfinancialcrisis,theG20endorsedanumberofreformsintendedtomakethefinancialsystemsafer.Acoreelementofthesereformsarepoliciesthatareaddressingthe“too-big-to-fail(TBTF)reforms”inordertoreducemoralhazardandsystemicrisk.Thesereformsincludestandardsforadditionallossabsorbencythroughcapitalsurchargesandrequirementsfortotalloss-absorbingcapacity,recommendationsforenhancedsupervisionandheightenedsupervisoryexpectations,andpoliciestoputintoplaceeffectiveresolutionregimesandresolutionplanningtoimprovetheresolvabilityofbanks.
Manyofthesystemicallyimportantbanksaffectedbythesereformsoperateacrossborders.Effectivepoliciestoaddressthetoo-big-to-failissuethusrequireinternationalpolicycoordination,andtheFinancialStabilityBoard(FSB)playsanimportantroleinthisregard.Whetherabankisconsideredtobegloballysystemicallyimportantisbasedonaninternationallyagreedsetofcriteria.Onthisbasis,theFSBpublishesanannuallistofabout30globallysystemicallyimportantbanksorG-SIBs.Inaddition,therearedomesticsystemicallyimportantbanksorDSIBs.Thesearedesignatedbytheirhomeauthorities,andtheirnumberstoodat132attheendof2018.FSBstandardsprovidethathostauthoritiesshouldimposeinternaltotalloss-absorbingcapacity(TLAC)requirementsformaterialsub-groupsofsystemicallyimportantbanksresidingintheirjurisdiction.Resolutionplansareinplace,cross-bordercrisismanagementgroupshavebeenestablishedforallG-SIBs,andhomeandhostauthoritieshavesignedinstitution-specificcross-bordercooperationagreementsformostG-SIBs.
TheFinancialStabilityBoardisevaluatingthesetoo-big-to-failreformsforsystemicallyimportantbanks.On28JunetheFSBpublishedareportforconsultation.Theconsultationcloseson30September,andresponsesfromawiderangeofstakeholdersarehighlywelcome.
Themainfindingsoftheevaluationcanbroadlybesummarisedasfollows:
Indicatorsofsystemicriskandmoralhazardhavefallen.Systemicallyimportantbanksaremuchbettercapitalisedandhavebuiltupsignificantloss-absorbingcapacity.Theirfundingcostsnowappeartoreflecttheprobabilityofabail-inintheeventoffailure.
EffectiveTBTFreformsbringnetbenefitstosociety.Notonlyarebanksmoreresilient,therearealsonosignsofmaterialnegativeside-effects.Andinparticular,therehasbeennoreductionintheaggregatesupplyofcredittotherealeconomy.
Therearestillgapsthatneedtobeaddressed.Someobstaclestoresolvabilityremain,andtherearegapsininformationavailabletomarketparticipantsandtopublicauthorities.
Intheseremarks,Iwouldliketofocusupontheimplicationsofthetoo-big-to-failreformsonglobalbanking.
Thecapacityofgloballyactivebankstoabsorbshockshasincreased
TworeformswithinthescopeoftheevaluationareintendedtoincreasethecapacityofG-SIBstoabsorblosses,bothasagoingconcernandinresolution.Onagoing-concernbasis,G-SIBsaresubjecttocapitalsurchargesthatrangefrom1%to2.5%ofrisk-weightedassets,orRWAs.Theserequirementsmustbemetwiththehighest-qualitytypeofcapital,CommonEquityTier1.G-SIBsmustalsomeetrequirementsforloss-absorbingcapacityinresolution.TheminimumTLACrequirement,whichisexpressedasaratioofbothrisk-weightedassets(RWAs)andtheBaselIIIleverageexposuremeasure,isbeingphasedinbetween2019and2022.
Intermsofcapital,clearprogresshasbeenmade.TheTier1capitalratiosofG-SIBshavedoubledsince2011.Overthesameperiod,leverageratioshavenearlydoubledaswell.Nevertheless,andnotwithstandingdifferencesindatasourcesandmeasurement,G-SIBsonaveragetendtohavelowerratiosofcapitaltoassetsthanotherbanks.Higherequitycapital,lowerrisk,andhigherfundingcostsforsystemicallyimportantbankswouldbeexpectedtolowerbanks’returnonequity.Inthissense,lowerbankprofitabilitymaybeinlinewithamorerobustbankingsystemandwithlowercostsforthetaxpayer.Beforethe2008financialcrisis,banksthatwereconsideredtobetoo-big-to-failineffectenjoyedanimplicitsubsidyfromthestate.Thisisacostlyeconomicdistortion,andthereformsaimtoreducethissubsidy.Ifthereformsarehavinganimpact,wewouldexpecttoseetheprofitabilityofG-SIBsfallrelativetootherbanks,allotherthingsequal.Atthesametime,lowprofitabilitymayalsobeanindicatorofexcesscapacityinthebankingsectorandlackofexit–anissuethatresolutionreformsmayhelptoaddress.
Intermsofbail-inabledebt,therehasbeenclearprogressaswell.G-SIBshaveissuedlargequantitiesofsuchdebtandaremeetingtheirminimumrequirementsforsuchloss-absorbingcapacity.Asattheendof2018,inadvancedeconomies,allG-SIBsdesignatedbeforetheendof2015hadratiosofTLACtoRWAsabovethe2019transitionalminimum,and21outofthe26G-SIBsanalysedalreadyhadratiosabovethe2022steady-stateminimum.TheresultsfortheTLACleverageratiowereevenmoreencouraging.
Therehasbeenprogresswithregardtothefeasibilityandcredibilityofresolution
Anothercentralplankofthereformshasbeentheestablishmentofresolutionframeworks.Resolutionisawayforauthoritiestodealwithafailingbankwithoutbailingitoutandwithoutinterruptingitscriticaleconomicfunctions–typicallybyimposinglossesonshareholdersandcreditors.AlmostalljurisdictionsthatarehometoG-SIBsnowhavecomprehensivebankresolutionregimesthatalignwiththeglobalstandard–theFSBKeyAttributes.Theyhavealmostallintroducedcomprehensivebankresolutionregimesandarenowcarryingoutverydetailedresolutionplanning.Thisgivesauthoritiesarangeofoptionsfordealingwithbanksinstress.
Theevaluationhasdevelopedaresolutionreformindex,whichispublishedontheFSBwebsite.[1]Theindexrangesbetween0and1,where0representsnoimplementationand1representsfullimplementation.Ithasbeenusedinanumberofanalysesdescribedintheconsultationreport.
Evidencefrommarketpricesandcreditratingssuggestthatresolutionreformsareseenascrediblebymarketparticipants.Thatis,marketparticipantsthinkthatthereissomeprobabilitythat,intheeventofabankfailure,losseswouldbeimposedonshareholdersandcreditorsratherthanontaxpayers.Marketpricessuggestthatinvestorsthinkthattheymaysufferlossesintheeventofabankfailureandarepricingtherisksaccordingly.Thisislikelytobeaffectingthebehaviourofbanksasagoingconcern–sowedonothavetoobserveanactual“failure”toobserveeffectsofthereforms
Changesinperceptionsofthecredibilityofresolutionareobviouslyhardtomeasure,andtheevaluationhasuseddifferentproxies.TheseincludeestimatedG-SIBs’fundingcostadvantagesbylookingatpricesofbonds,creditdefaultswapsandequities.Inevitably,theresultsarenotidentical.Generally,theyshowthatfundingcostadvantagespeakedduringtheglobalfinancialcrisisandhavesincefallen,althoughnotbelowlevelsseenbeforethecrisis.Lowerfundingcostadvantagesindirectlysuggestthattheimplicitfundingsubsidyhasfallen.
Estimatedfundingcostadvantagesarealsotypicallylowerinjurisdictionsthathaveimplementedresolutionreformsmorefully,asmeasuredbytheresolutionreformindex.ThissuggeststhatmorecomprehensiveimplementationofresolutionreformsisassociatedwithareducedfundingadvantageforSIBs,andhencewithlesseconomicdistortion.Inaddition,theevaluationhaslookedatcreditratingsandbail-inpremiaimplicitincreditdefaultswap(CDS)spreads,whicharelargerforriskierbanks.Bothoftheseresultssuggestthatmarketdisciplinehasimproved.
Thisprogresshasnotcomeattheexpenseoflendingtotheeconomyorincreasefragmentationoffinancialmarkets
Generally,theevaluationfindsthatthebenefitsofthereformssignificantlyoutweighthecosts.Theevaluationlookedatbroadereffectsofreformsonthefinancialsystemandontherealeconomy,anditlookedatcostsandbenefitsfromthesocialperspective,whichisnotthesameastheperspectiveoftheprivatesector.Forexample,successfullyloweringimplicitsubsidiesmeanshigherfundingcostsforbanks–butatthesametimelowercostsfortaxpayers.
Thefinancialcrisishassloweddown,butnotreversed,thelong-termtrendtowardsglobalfinancialintegration.Theaggregateretrenchmentininternationalbankingsincethecrisisstemsfromadeclineincross-borderlendingbyEuropeanbanks.Cross-borderlendingbetweenotherregionshascontinuedtoexpand.Atthesametime,lendingbyinternationalbankshasshiftedtomorestablelocally-fundedsourcesinlocalcurrencies.Cross-borderlendingbyadvancedeconomybankstoborrowersinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs)hasgrownsincethecrisis,andintraregionallendinghasalsoincreasedwithinEMDEs,inparticularinLatinAmericaandAsia.
ThereisnoevidencethattheimplementationofTBTFreformshasreducedcross-borderlending.Totalsyndicatedlending,forexample,hasbeenincreasingafterasharpdropin2009.WhileG-SIBslendtoforeignborrowersmorethanotherbanksdo,theproportionofforeignlendingisrelativelystableforbothgroups(fluctuatingbetween55%and65%forG-SIBsandbetween30%and40%forotherbanks).Measuresofcross-borderconnectednessreachedpeakvaluesattheonsetofthefinancialcrisisand,afterasharpdropin2008,havereturnedtoorsurpassedtheirpre-crisislevels.
Somerespondentstoacallforpublicfeedbacklaunchedin2019arguedthatinparticularinternalTLACrequirementscoulddrivemarketfragmentation.[2]ItshouldbenotedthattheroleofinternalTLACistoensurethatmaterialsubsidiarieshavesufficientlossabsorbingcapacity.Buttherearetradeoffs.AsFSBChairRandalQuarlesputitlastyear,“hostauthoritieswantcertaintyandhomeauthoritieswantflexibility.”[3]AccordingtotheTLACtermsheet,eachmaterialsub-groupmustmaintaininternalTLACof75%to90%oftheexternalTLACrequirementthatwouldapplytoitifitwerearesolutiongroup.Thismaybehigherthanwhatindividualbankswouldchoose,anditwouldbehigherthanwhatwewouldobserveinafullyintegratedmarket.Butfromasocialpolicyperspective,pre-positionedresourceshavevalue:Thefullyintegratedmarketisnottherightbenchmark.Intimesofcrisis,thereareincentivestousethefirstmoveradvantageandhoardfunds.InternalTLACpreventsthisandencouragessupervisorycoordination.Hence,internalTLACsupportsorderlycross-borderresolutionandservesasacoordinationdevicetodiminishhostauthorities’incentivetoring-fenceinresolution.Thatsaid,hardevidenceontheeffectsofinternalTLACisnotyetavailable.G-SIBshavenotpublishedinformationonTLACinaconsistentmannerandinformationaboutinternalTLACisnotavailable.
Moreneedstobedone
Overall,theresultsofthisevaluationshowthatthetoo-big-to-failreformshavecontributedtomaketheglobalfinancialsystemingeneralandglobalbankingmoreresilient.AlthoughtheevaluationdoesnotcoverthecurrentperiodofstressintheCOVID-19pandemic,thecurrentsituationclearlyrevealsthebenefitsofhavingresilientfinancialinstitutionsthatcanbuffershocks.Thepandemicrepresentsthebiggesttestofthepost-reformfinancialsystemtodate,asithaspushedtheglobaleconomyintoarecessionofuncertainmagnitudeandduration.Therapidandcoordinatedresponsebyfiscal,financialandmonetaryauthoritieshasmitigatedtheimpactoftheshockontherealeconomyandthefinancialsystem.However,theeffectsofthepandemiccontinuetoputthefinancialsystemunderstrain.ThefindingsofthereportsuggestthatTBTFreformshavecontributedtotheresilienceofthebankingsectoranditsabilitytoabsorb,ratherthanamplify,shocks.Majorbanksaremuchbettercapitalised,lessleveragedandmoreliquidthantheywerebeforetheglobalfinancialcrisis.Systemicallyimportantbanksinadvancedeconomieshavebuiltupsignificantloss-absorbingandrecapitalisationcapacitybyissuinginstrumentsthatcanbearlossesintheeventofresolution.Inresponsetothepandemic,theanalyticalworkwillbeupdated.
Givenallthesebenefits,thenewregimefortheregulationandresolutionofsystemicallyimportantbanksisalsofairlynew,andwearelearninghowitisoperating.Thisexperiencerevealsroomforimprovementofthecurrentsystemandissuesthatwarrantongoingmonitoring.Thereportfocusesonthefollowinggaps:
Risksarisingfromtheshiftofcreditintermediationtonon-bankfinancialintermediariesshouldcontinuetobecloselymonitored.
Informationsystemscanbeimprovedfurtherinordertoenhanceabilityofmarkets,authorities,andotherstakeholderstoassessthefunctioningofthesystem.
ComparedtoG-SIBs,relativelylittleispublishedbynationalauthoritiesandatthegloballevelaboutD-SIBs’characteristicsortheregulationstowhichtheyaresubject.
Risksarisingfromtheshiftofcreditintermediationtonon-bankfinancialintermediariesshouldcontinuetobecloselymonitored.
Furtherreading
FSBTBTFconsultationreport:
FSBevaluationframework:
Findingsofearlierevaluations:
Footnotes:
[1]
[2]See“Publicresponsestothecallforpublicfeedbackontheevaluationoftoo-big-to-failreforms”,FSBJune2019:
[3]Quarles,RK(2019):“GovernmentofUnion:AchievingCertaintyinCross-BorderFinance”,remarksatFSBworkshop,September.
编辑李锦璇
来源BIS
审校金天、蒋旭
监制董熙君、安然、魏唯
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【海外之声 | 全球银行业“大而不倒”改革的启示】Weonlysharethemostvaluablefinancialinsights.


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